Ossify Digital Engineering builds and maintains software for companies that cannot afford a bad deploy. Nothing goes out without a feature flag, which means a rollback takes seconds rather than an emergency release.
# Every change ships behind a flag. rollout: strategy: "flagged" default_state: "off" rollback: revert_flag() # seconds, not a redeploy on_incident: notify: ["client", "on_call"] postmortem: required shared_with_client: true
Something breaks in production at 4pm. The fix is to revert the merge, rebuild, run the pipeline, and deploy — twenty minutes on a good day, longer if the pipeline is contended or the migration was one-way. During all of it the thing is still broken.
Feature flags solve this and get skipped anyway, because adding a flag to a change is extra work for a change that is probably fine. The discipline erodes exactly where it matters: small, obviously-safe edits, which is where a surprising share of incidents come from.
Every change we ship is flagged and defaults to off. Turning something off is a config change, not a deploy, and our median rollback is 41 seconds. It costs us maybe 8% more engineering time per feature and we do not present that as free.
The same table goes in every statement of work.
| Field | Commitment |
|---|---|
| repository | Client-owned organisation, from the first commit |
| test_coverage | Reported per pull request, never asserted verbally |
| flag_default | Off. Every change ships behind a feature flag |
| rollback_time | Under 60 seconds via flag revert |
| postmortems | Written for every incident, shared with the client |
| on_call | Ours during the engagement, yours after handover |
| handover | Runbook, architecture notes, and a live walkthrough |
Twelve engineers in Wilmington. Nothing offshored or subcontracted.
New applications from architecture through launch, in your repository, with flags and coverage reporting from the first commit.
Incremental replacement of systems that still earn money. We do not propose rewrites that pause the business for a year.
CI, infrastructure as code, observability, and the flag system itself. Backups verified by restore, monthly.
Third-party and internal integrations built to alert loudly on failure rather than to drop records quietly.
Codebase, security, and delivery review with written findings you keep, including when the finding is that the code is fine.
Patching, monitoring, and paid on-call, with a written postmortem for every incident shared with you.
Every incident gets a written postmortem and you receive it, including the ones caused by us. Most vendors handle incidents in a call and never write anything down, which means the same failure recurs and nobody can point at why.
Test coverage is reported per pull request, as a number in the PR rather than a claim in a status meeting. Where coverage drops we say so and explain the trade.
Handover is a runbook and a live walkthrough, not a zip file. On-call is ours during the engagement and yours after, and we train for that transition rather than assuming it.
Architecture, risks, and a written estimate with the assumptions listed separately.
Two-week increments, flagged and deployed continuously to an environment you can see.
Load testing, observability, and runbooks written before launch rather than after the first incident.
Paid on-call, monthly restore tests, and a postmortem for every incident.
Logistics, healthcare administration, financial services, and industrial software across the Carolinas and remotely across the US.
Engagements from about $45,000 to $900,000, and we will tell you when an off-the-shelf product covers the requirement, which happens more often than a software firm usually admits.
We decline roughly one enquiry in five. Usually a rewrite that should be an incremental migration, or a build that a configured SaaS product already does properly.
Started the firm in 2018 after eleven years in platform engineering. Reviews every architecture.
Thirteen years. Owns the flag discipline and the coverage numbers.
Ten years. Runs CI, observability, and the monthly restore tests.
Twelve years replacing systems without switching them off.
A bad release was off in under a minute with a config change. Our previous vendor would have needed a build and twenty minutes.
They sent us a postmortem for an outage they had caused, in writing, unprompted. That is not normal vendor behaviour.
We asked for a rewrite. They argued for an incremental migration over eleven months and were right.
If the answer involves a build, that is the answer.